In 1774 George Washington saw that if parts of the Chesapeake could be dredged and a canal dug from the Potomac to Georgetown (now Washington, D.C.) and then beyond to the Great Lakes and the Ohio River, commerce could flow more readily throughout the region -- a vision for one of America's first infrastructure projects.

The plan was rejected by several stakeholders, including Maryland, and only after winning the Revolutionary War and becoming President was Washington able to muster the necessary political support to have the plan approved. After the founding of the Patowmack Co., the work began but was not completed until after his death. The canal only operated for twenty-six years until various difficulties led to bankruptcy.

Then, as today, the lack of experience necessary to bring together the public and private sector and reconcile the collision of various special interest groups hampers infrastructure development. Almost two hundred and fifty years later, America still struggles with the design, financing and implementation of infrastructure projects, whether for roads, ports, airports, transmission lines or social infrastructure.

Although some early progress was made with the Chicago Skyway, the Indiana Toll Road, I-595 in Florida, Capital Beltway, SH 130 in Texas, or more recently Chicago metered parking, many projects have failed, while many more remain stuck on the drawing board with cities, states and developers. Investors, politicians, municipalities, states, and various related agencies are deeply and understandably frustrated. With good reason, knowledgeable global investors consider the American infrastructure sector an emerging market -- less advanced than Central and Eastern Europe or Latin America.

Recent unrealized public-private partnerships (P3s) in the infrastructure sector abound: In Texas: SH 45, US 183A, SH 121, and Harris County toll roads; in Pennsylvania: the Pennsylvania Turnpike and Southport Marine Terminal; in Florida: the original north-south high speed rail and recently, Alligator Alley; in Illinois: Midway Airport; in Oregon: the Port of Portland; and in Missouri, the Bridge Replacement and Rehabilitation Program.

Projects on the verge of make-it-or-break-it are: Port of Miami Tunnel (twice resurrected), Jackson Motorway in Mississippi, Oakland Airport Connector (second try), Seagirt Marine Terminal in Baltimore, The Cotton Belt Rail Line in Dallas, Denver FasTracks, and the Long Beach Courthouse. Other projects such as the ports in Charleston, Savannah, Wilmington, NC, and Wilmington, DE are in planning stages, as is a decision on CenterPoint's $8.6 billion unsolicited bid to lease Port of Norfolk terminals. Parking privatizations are being considered in several cities, including Los Angeles, Detroit and Pittsburgh, while there has been considerable public backlash to Morgan Stanley's all equity (more than $1.15 billion) acquisition of Chicago's metered parking operations.

Given the recognized need in the United States for billions of dollars of infrastructure spending and the availability of those billions in various infrastructure funds, why aren't more projects moving steadily along? Why is the United States, one of the world's most advanced countries, an "emerging nation" in the infrastructure sector at such a crucial time for economic development and job creation, which are readily supplied by infrastructure work? Why can major infrastructure projects such as the M1/M5 motorway in Hungary, the Yellow Line expressway in Brazil, Aguas Argentina in Buenos Aires, the multiple projects built under the Private Finance Initiative in England, roads and hospitals in Canada, roads, rail and hospitals in Spain, the Three Gorges Dam project in China or the many other BOT, BOO, PPP projects be completed around the world while America, a stronghold of entrepreneurial spirit and finance, falters?

While it's easy to blame the economic crisis for the absence of debt capital and failures to close, it is not the core of the problem as evidenced by the referenced projects that have closed. Behind the failures knowledgeable people on both sides of the table have made misjudgments and mistakes in trying to adapt a classic P3 model to a market truly in its infancy and fractured by regional cultural biases and politics.

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