Despite new technologies and process improvements, collaboration is dead on arrival for many companies. This is because the structure of many organizations has barely changed since the Industrial Age. Command-and-control defined Industrial Age organizational structure, and remnants of this structure remain embedded in organizations.

Companies operating in command-and-control mode pay a few people to think and pay everybody else to carry out orders. Ideas and information get stuck in silos, and we lose opportunities to develop better ideas, make better decisions, manufacture better products and create new markets.

My new book, The Bounty Effect: 7 Steps to The Culture of Collaboration, focuses on how to shift the structure of an Industrial Age command-and-control organization to an Information Age collaborative structure. Based on the book, here are 5 ways a manufacturing company can adopt a more collaborative structure:

Establish All-Access People Policy

Technology lets us interact with anybody on the fly regardless of level, role or region. But organizational structure and culture often lag behind this capability. Adopting an All-Access People Policy means everybody has immediate access to everybody else regardless of level, role or region. Plus team members have the organization’s blessing to use this access whenever necessary. The technology enhancing this shift is unified communications. With UC, people can easily view each other’s availability, see one another’s location and connect spontaneously through instant messaging, voice, web conferencing, videoconferencing and telepresence.

Without an All-Access People Policy, information can get lost or buried—sometimes with devastating consequences. If NASA and its contractors had an All-Access People Policy, the space shuttle Challenger disaster might have been averted. Roger Boisjoly, an engineer at Morton Thiokol, warned in a 1985 memo to the company’s vice president of engineering that seals on Challenger’s booster rocket joints could fail. Despite the memo and other warnings, managers at Morton Thiokol gave NASA the okay to launch Challenger. Seventy-three seconds into its flight, Challenger broke apart and disintegrated over the Atlantic Ocean. All seven crew members died, because the seals on the booster rocket joints failed as Boisjoly had warned.

Suppose Roger Boisjoly had felt empowered to share his concerns with Morton Thiokol’s CEO or NASA senior leaders without going through channels? What if senior leaders of Morton Thiokol had valued Boisjoly’s input? Suppose key information had traveled beyond a silo? And what if there were a mechanism to share and access input and concerns spontaneously across the space program? The results for the Challenger team may have been different.