Why Building a Manufacturing Division From Scratch Beat the Safer Bet
Key Highlights
- It took some convincing in the boardroom to go with starting a new industrial paints division from the ground up rather than acquiring a company in that space.
- But I did my research and found the acquisition candidates all came with baggage that made the conditions unfavorable.
- I made my case to the board, presenting a full feasibility study with a six-year P&L projection.
- The board came around after they saw the margin differential on a five-year horizon.
- In this article, I share what we did to put the right systems in place and succeed.
When a mid-size manufacturer spots a growth opportunity in an adjacent product category, the instinct is often the same: acquire. Buy an existing business. Inherit its infrastructure, its customer base, its people. It feels faster, safer and easier to justify in a boardroom.
I know because I sat in that boardroom.
Early in my career, I was hired by a steel manufacturer that wanted to enter the industrial paints market to lead the launch of the new division. The leadership team had already begun evaluating acquisition targets: small to mid-size paint companies that could be folded into our existing distribution network.
On paper, it made sense. We had the capital, the customer relationships and the market access. All we needed was the product.
But as I dug into the numbers and the operational realities, I became convinced that acquiring was the wrong move. Building the division from scratch, while harder and slower, would produce a fundamentally better outcome.
That was not a popular position. Here is why I held it anyway, and what the experience taught me about how manufacturers should think about the build-versus-acquire decision.
The Hidden Cost of Inheriting Someone Else's Decisions
The acquisition candidates we evaluated all shared a common problem: They came with baggage: Legacy quality systems that did not match our standards. Supplier contracts that locked us into unfavorable terms. Organizational cultures that would clash with ours. And perhaps most critically, cost structures that were baked in and difficult to restructure without gutting the very thing we were paying for.
When you acquire a manufacturing operation, you inherit someone else's decisions—their equipment choices, their process design, their hiring philosophy, their quality compromises. Some of those decisions were made for reasons that no longer exist. But you are stuck with them, at least for a while.
The financial models made acquisition look attractive because they assumed smooth integration. But anyone who has actually integrated a manufacturing acquisition knows that smooth integration is a fantasy that lives exclusively on spreadsheets.
What Building From Zero Actually Looks Like
Building from scratch meant starting with nothing—no production lines, no supply chain, no team, no institutional knowledge. That sounds terrifying, and honestly, it was. But it also meant something powerful: Every single decision was ours to make.
We designed quality systems that matched our standards from day one, rather than retrofitting someone else's. We negotiated supplier contracts with leverage, because we were a new customer offering volume commitments rather than an acquirer inheriting locked-in terms. We hired people who fit the culture we wanted to build, not the culture we would have been forced to absorb.
The hardest part was not the operational complexity. It was managing the tension between speed-to-market pressure and getting the foundation right. Leadership wanted revenue yesterday, while I was arguing for patience and groundwork. Every week felt like a negotiation between short-term gains and long-term structural advantage.
What resolved that tension, ultimately, was data. I built the financial case showing that the cost structure of a purpose-built division would outperform the acquisition scenario within two years, and compound from there.
The full feasibility study I presented to leadership included a six-year P&L projection, capital expenditure analysis (the plant setup required roughly $7 million in initial investment), production capacity modeling at 38,000 kiloliters per annum, raw material cost structures and a detailed market analysis covering competitive positioning and demand forecasts.
The core of the argument was a side-by-side comparison: what it would cost to acquire an existing paint company versus what it would cost to build, factoring in not just the purchase price but integration costs, inherited supplier contracts, workforce restructuring and the margin drag from legacy cost structures.
The build scenario showed roughly $5 million in annual savings and a path to over $130 million in revenue once stabilized, with around 7% EBITDA margins.
When leadership could see the margin differential on a five-year horizon, the patience became easier to justify.
What Happened
The division scaled. Revenue grew to a level that exceeded what any of the acquisition targets could have delivered. More importantly, we owned every element of the operation—quality, cost, speed, talent. There was nothing to untangle, no legacy to work around.
Looking back, I do not think building is always the right answer. But I do think manufacturers default to acquisition too reflexively, often because it feels less risky.
The irony is that acquisition carries enormous hidden risk—cultural mismatch, integration cost overruns, inherited technical debt—that does not show up until after the deal closes.
A Framework, Not a Formula
If I were advising a manufacturing leader facing this decision today, I would suggest thinking about it through three lenses.
First, operational control. How important is it that every element of the new operation reflects your standards? If quality, culture and process design are core to your competitive advantage, building preserves that. Acquiring dilutes it.
Second, total cost of ownership. Acquisition models almost always underestimate integration costs. Build models almost always overestimate timeline risk. Adjust both honestly before comparing.
Third, talent. Can you attract and develop the people you need for a greenfield operation? If your employer brand and industry reputation can draw talent, building gives you a team that is aligned from the start. If you are entering a category where you have no credibility, acquisition might be the faster path to a capable workforce.
None of this is a formula. It is a framework for asking better questions before defaulting to the conventional answer.
Manufacturing leaders are trained to optimize. We look for efficiency, for the path of least resistance, for the option that minimizes downside.
Acquisition feels like that option. But sometimes the path of least resistance leads you into someone else's problems.
Building is harder. It is slower. It demands conviction. But when the foundation is yours, so is everything that gets built on top of it.
About the Author
Abhishek Dhanraj
Pathways Operations Manager, Amazon
Abhishek Dhanraj is an operations leader with six years of experience in manufacturing and industrial environments. He holds a chemical engineering degree from Jadavpur University and an MBA in Business Analytics from the College of William & Mary. He is joining Amazon as a Pathways Operations Manager. His work has been published in SupplyChainBrain and Poets&Quants.
